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In this paper, I will present an account of two types of negative polarity items (the 
so-called "strong" and "weak" types). The structure of the paper is as follows. In 
section two, I briefly outline the data, the leading accounts, and the main motivation 
for my account. Section three contains the account itself and application of it to 
various data. In section four, I mention some formal properties of the proposal and 
discuss its explanatory power. 
2 The Problem 
2.1 The Data 
The classic example of a weak negative polarity item (NPI) is the determiner any. 
As has often been noted, any in many cases seems to prefer negative environments, 
in some sense, over positive ones: 
( 1 )  I don't have any apples. 
(2) * I have any apples. 
(3) No student has any apples. 
(4) * Every student has any apples. 
However, the following data show that the class of NPI licensers include more than 
just different sorts of negation, at least in any pre-theoretic sense of "negation": 
(5) * Some student has any apples. 
(6) At most two students have any apples. 
(7) * Most students have any apples. 
(8) Few students have any apples. 
(9) No student who has any apples is happy. 
( 1 0) Every student who has any apples is happy. 
( 1 1 )  * Some student who has any apples is happy. 
( 1 2) At most two students who have any apples are happy. 
( 1 3) Most students who have any apples are happy. 
( 14) Few students who have any apples are happy. 
Only a subset of the contexts that license NPls are illustrated above. Other such 
contexts include comparatives, conditionals, adversative predicates and questions. 
However, I will limit my attention here to NPI licensing by quantified noun phrases. 
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The reader is invited to consult (Jackson 1994) for a fuller discussion of other sorts 
of NPI licensing environments. 
One assumption I am making about any that will be important below is that 
any is an existential quantifier, rather than a universal quantifier. In some sentences, 
such as ( 1 ), it is not obvious which of these two analyses is correct. However, in 
others, such as (6), it is clear that any must be functioning as an existential quantifier. 
(There are cases where any functions as a universal quantifiers, the so-called "free-• 
choice" uses of any, but these can be distinguished from the "polarity-sensitive" 
use, and will not be considered here.) Other arguments for the existential status of 
any can be found in the literature (e.g., (Ladusaw 1980), (Linebarger 1 980)). 
As their name suggests, the strong NPls appear in a more restricted set of 
contexts than the weak NPls. Here are examples of the distribution of the Dutch 
expression ook maar, the classic example of a strong NPI: 
( 1 5) Geen kind heeft ook maar iets gezien. 
No child has anything seen 
No child saw anything. 
( 1 6) leder kind dat ook maar iets heeft gezien mag nu naar huis gaan. 
Every child that anything has seen may now to house go 
Every child that has seen anything may now go home. 
( 17) * Hoogstens twee kinderen hebben ook maar iets gezien. 
At most two children have anything seen 
At most two children saw anything. 
( 1 8) * Weinig kinderen hebben ook maar iets gezien. 
Few children have anything seen 
Few children saw anything. 
( 19) * De meeste kinderen die ook maar iets hebben gezien mogen nu naar huis 
gaan. 
Most children that anything have seen may now to house 
go 
Most children that saw anything may now go home. 
2.2 Leading Accounts 
The leading account of the weak NPls is that of Ladusaw (Ladusaw 1 980). The 
central idea is very simple: an NPI must be licensed by a monotone decreasing 
operator. A monotone decreasing operator is one such that: 
O(A) 1\ B � A � O(B) 
Thus, for example, (20) is licensed because it entails (2 1) :  
(20) No student has any apples. 
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(2 1 )  No student has any red apples. 
The reader can verify that this account makes the right prediction for each of the 
sentences above, other than ( 1 3) and ( 14). To see that ( 1 3) is problematic, note that 
(22) does not entail (23): 
(22) Most students that ate any apples are happy. 
(23) Most students that ate any poisoned apples are happy. 
The leading account of the strong NPIs is that of Frans Zwarts (Zwarts 1986, 
Zwarts 1993). It is like Ladusaw's account, in that the items in question are claimed 
to licensed by operators with a certain logical property. In this case, the relevant 
class of operators are the anti-additive ones. An anti-additive operator is one such 
that: 
O(A) ¢> /\ O(Ai) (A = UiAi) 
; 
As with downward monotonicity, we can check for anti-additivity by seeing if 
certain entailments are valid. For example, the anti-additivity of nobody can be 
determined by checking that the following hold: 
• Nobody (V PI or V P2) ::} Nobody V PI and nobody V P2 
• Nobody V PI and nobody V P2 ::} Nobody (V PI or V P2) 
• Nobody V PI or nobody V P2 ::} Nobody (V PI and V P2) 
The Zwarts analysis also makes the correct predictions for the other environments 
considered above. 
The reader is referred to the work of Ladusaw and Zwarts for a fuller 
discussion of their accounts. 
2.3 Motivation 
2.3.1 Strength and Generality 
The guiding intuition for my account will be an intuition that many have had in one 
form or another; namely, that negative polarity items are related in some way to what 
we might call "strong statements". This intuition is most explicitly incorporated 
in the account of Kadmon and Landman (Kadmon and Landman 1 993), who posit 
that NPls induce strengthening of a statement. This intuition can be supported by 
comparing pairs of sentences like the following: 
(24) a. John didn't lift a finger. 
b. John did nothing. 
(25) a. John didn't donate a red cent. 
b. John donated no money. 
(26) a. John didn't budge an inch. 
b. John didn't move. 
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Although (24a) and (24b) are roughly synonymous, at least in terms of truth con­
ditions, it seems that (24a) has a special emphatic flavor that is lacking in (24b). 
Likewise for (25a) and (25b) and (26a) and (26b). This emphatic flavor can be 
found in many other NPIs besides the idioms. Taking any, for example, consider 
the following sentences, which were discussed by Kadmon and Landman: 
(27) a. I don't have any potatoes. 
b. I don't have potatoes. 
c. I don't have a potato. 
(27a) seems to be stronger or more emphatic, in some sense, than (27b) or (27c) . 
Along these lines, note what happens if we focus the occurrences of any and a in 
(27a) and (27c): 
(28) I don't have ANY potatoes. 
(29) I don't have A potato. 
With any, focusing increases the emphatic flavor, whereas with a focusing has no 
such effect. The question that requires explanation, then, is why do so many NPIs 
have this emphatic flavor, this association with strong statements. It is not apparent 
what downward monotonicity, for example, has to do with strength. In contrast, an 
account such as Kadmon and Landman's seems to have more potential for explaining 
this observation. 
However, I believe Kadmon and Landman's account goes astray in the way 
they try to cash out the intuition just discussed. They claim that any introduces 
truth-conditional strengthening over corresponding sentences with other indefinites 
such as NPs with a, or bare plurals. This position is perhaps tenable for examples 
like (27), but it plainly is not for numerous other examples, such as: 
(30) a. John hasn't  visited any African countries. 
b. John hasn't visited an African country. 
(30a) and (30b) are clearly equivalent; hence there is no truth-conditional strength­
ening induced by any. 
The moral I draw from examples like this is that we should not attempt to 
define "strong statement" in a "relative" way, as Kadmon and Landman do, by in­
sisting that statements with NPIs have different truth conditions than corresponding 
statements without NPIs. Instead, I will propose an "absolute" definition. In this 
way I will not prohibit statements without NPIs from being strong, and, hence, the 
equivalence of (30a) and (30b) will not be a problem for me. 
lt is worth taking a moment here to reexamine whether the notion we need 
to capture is precisely that of a strong statement. Presumably, strength is related to 
entailment relations: one statement is stronger than another if the first entails the 
second. With this in mind, consider the following: 
(3 1 )  No student has any apples. 
(32) * Exactly two students have any apples. 
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(33) Every student who has any apples is happy. 
(34) * Exactly two students who have any apples are happy. 
In these minimal pairs, it is not the case that the NPI-licensing sentence entails the 
sentence that does not license NPls. Hence, it is not clear how one would go about 
defining "strong statement" in such a way that we get the right result for sentences 
like (3 1-34). Thus, I will instead propose that NPls are licensed in what I will call 
"general statements" . At an intuitive level, (3 1 )  and (33) are "general" because they 
make universal, or negative universal, claims about students and apples. A sentence 
like (6) may not be strictly general, but it does seem "close" to general, in the sense 
that it entails that there is almost no apple ownership among students. 
2.3.2 Intervention Effects 
One empirical problem for many theories of negative polarity involves what we 
might term "intervention" effects (see (Linebarger 1980, Linebarger 1 987» . For 
theories that posit that NPls are licensed by a certain sort of operator (like the 
Ladusaw and Zwarts theories), the problem is to account for why certain sorts of 
things seem to block NPI licensing. For example, contrast the following « 35) is 
from (Linebarger 1987» : 
(35) * John didn't give a red cent to every charity. 
(36) John didn't give a red cent to any charity. 
A similar contrast can be found among the following: 
(37) * No student gave every teacher any apples. 
(38) No student gave a teacher any apples. 
(39) No student gave more than a few teachers any apples. 
The , * ,  for (37) indicates that it is unacceptable under the (pragmatically favored) 
reading in which every teacher outscopes any apples. If (37) seems less bad than 
(35), I suspect it is simply because it is hard to prevent oneself from giving any apples 
wide scope over every teacher. 
These data are problematic for the original Ladusaw analysis because the 
NPI occurs within the scope of a monotone decreasing operator, and yet the sentence 
is unacceptable. Some work has suggested that any quantified expression will block 
NPI licensing, but (38) and (39) are counterexamples to that claim. It should also be 
noted that couching Ladusaw's theory in terms of (possibly complex) environments, 
instead of operators, will not help. No student gave every teacher X is a monotone 
decreasing environment, as evidenced by the entailment of (41 )  by (40) : 
(40) No student gave every teacher an apple. 
(4 1 )  No student gave every teacher a red apple. 
Thus, the unacceptability of (35) and (37) is problematic for this hypothetical 
account. 
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It is interesting to note that the contrast between (37) and (38) is paralleled 
in a contrast between the modals might and must: 
(42) Everyone who might have ever met the victim was investigated. 
(43) * Everyone who must have ever met the victim was investigated. 
Might is like an existential quantifier in that you can think of it as an existential 
quantifier over possible worlds, while must is like a universal quantifier in that you 
can think of it as a universal quantifier over possible worlds. 
The moral I draw from examples like (35-39) and (42-43) is that the class 
of operators that cause intervention effects is determined by a semantic principle 
or principles - just like the class of operators that license NPIs. The question, 
though, is how to achieve this in a natural way. In particular, it seems unlikely that 
there are two unrelated semantic accounts, one for the licensing operators, and one 
for the intervening operators. In the account I present, the class of licensing and 
intervening operators will fall out from a single semantic principle. 
2.3.3 Unanswered Questions 
Further motivation for my account comes from puzzling questions that I believe 
cannot be answered under the Ladusaw/Zwarts theory. The first is "Why do so 
many NPIs correspond to existential quantifiers?" We have argued already that 
polarity-sensitive any is an existential quantifier. For similar reasons, it should also 
seem clear that ever is an existential quantifier (over time). Consider also several 
examples of the negative-polarity idioms: 
(44) Mary didn't lift a finger. 
(45) Mary didn't do a thing. 
(46) Mary didn't hear a sound. 
(47) This painting isn't worth beans. 
(48) John didn't do Uack)shit. 
All of these idioms involve an item that is typically translated as an existential 
quantifier. In (44-46), it is a singular indefinite, in (47) it is a bare plural, and in 
(48) it is a mass noun. Hence it is not surprising that it turns out to be plausible to 
interpret these expressions -in their idiomatic interpretations, as well as their literal 
interpretations - as existentially quantified expressions. The idiomatic reading of 
(44), for example, can be given the following logical form: 
(49) -,some x(action(x), did(Mary, x» 
Even some NPIs that may not seem at first sight to be existential quantifiers 
tum out to be naturally analyzed as such upon closer inspection. Consider, for 
example, yet: 
(50) No one is here yet. 
(5 1 )  * Everyone is here yet. 
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At first glance, one might think that yet simply means now, so that (50) means that 
no one is now here. However, note that (50) would be an extremely odd thing to 
say at a party, say, if someone had arrived a few minutes ago and then departed just 
before the utterance of the sentence. (50) seems to, in fact, convey the idea that no 
one has been here during a contextually determined interval of time ending at the 
present moment. This reading results if we treat yet as an existential quantifier over 
points of time in this interval. So, for example, the logical form of (50) would be 
(52) (where to is the contextually determined start point of the interval):  
(52) no x(person(x), some t(t < now 1\ t > to ,  is-here-at(x, t))) 
Consider also until. As Kartunnen (Kartunnen 1974) has argued, this item 
has a polarity-sensitive use (as well as a non-polarity-sensitive use). Only the 
polarity-sensitive use is available when an until clause combines with a non-durative 
predicate. For example: 
(53) * John left until the host spilled beer on him. 
(54) John didn't leave until the host spilled beer on him. 
(55) * Everyone left until the host spilled beer on him. 
(56) No one left until the host spilled beer on him. 
(57) Few people left until the host spilled beer on them. 
As Kartunnen points out, on its polarity-sensitive usage until means the same as 
before. This can be checked by replacing until with before in (54), (56) and (57). 
Furthermore, before (and hence this meaning of until) can be naturally treated as 
an existential quantifier over time. On this analysis, (56) gets the following logical 
form: 
(58) no x(person(x), some t(every t' (spilled-beer-on-at(the-host, x, t ') ,  t < t'), 
left-at(x, t))) 
The relevance of the generalization I am arguing for in this section is the 
following. If polarity-sensitivity is just a lexical property that items are free to have 
or not to have, then there is no apparent reason why universal quantifiers should 
never (or almost never) be NPls. In general, the Ladusaw and Zwarts accounts give 
no reason to believe that polarity sensitivity should be associated with some types 
of items more than others. 
A related puzzle for any theory of polarity is why there are the limited 
range of NPI licensing conditions that there are. We have seen two types, the 
strong and the weak, and there may be others, but there does not seem to be an 
unlimited number. For the LadusawlZwarts approach, the puzzle can be posed via 
the following questions. Why should there be items that appear only in monotone 
decreasing contexts, but not items that appear only in monotone increasing contexts? 
What do downward monotonicity and anti-additivity have in common? In general, 
we want to know what the various NPI licensing conditions have in common that is 
not possessed by other possible licensing conditions. 
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3 The Account 
3.1 The Basics 
The account I will propose can be seen as an attempt to formalize the idea that NPls 
occur in general statements. The idea I will pursue is that a statement it is general 
if it is easy to find counterexamples to it (or "negative witnesses", as I shall term 
them). With this in mind, consider the following two sentences: 
(59) No student has any apples. 
(60) Every student who has any apples is happy. 
Intuitively, (59) is falsified by a tuple of a student and an apple in the ownership 
relation, and (60) is falsified by a tuple of an unhappy student and an apple in the 
ownership relation. If we look at other examples, though, we see that our notion of 
"negative witness" must be defined in such a way as to include small sets of tuples 
that falsify a sentence: 
(61)  At most two students have any apples. 
A set of three student-apple pairs would be a negative witness for (6 1) ,  whereas 
singleton negative witness sets suffice for (59) and (60). Contrast (62): 
(62) * Every student has any apples. 
A small set of tuples in the ownership relation cannot falsify (62). 
The condition on NPI licensing that I propose is called the "negative wit­
nessing condition". It holds of an arbitrarily complex formula with respect to an 
occurrence of an atomic formula within that complex formula. For example, as­
suming the logical form of (59) is (63), the negative witnessing condition will hold 
of (63) with respect to the occurrence of has: 
(63) no x(student(x), some y(apple(y), has(x, y))) 
The condition is as follows: 
cP satisfies negative witnessing with respect to P iff: 
V'M3W(V'w E W(Small(w))/WA(M(P I A) l= ....,cP ...... 3w E W(w � A)) )  
M(P I A) refers t o  the model that differs from M at most in that the denotation of 
P is set to A. What this condition says is that for any model M there is a set of 
(potential) negative witnesses W. (Ignore, for the moment, the question of what 
Small(w) is supposed to mean.) As you vary the denotation of the predicate P 
(holding everything else fixed), the formula cP is false if and only if some negative 
witness is a subset of the denotation of P. For example, for (63) an appropriate 
choice for the set W (in any given model) is: 
{{ <s, a> } I student(s) A apple(a)} 
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We still need to explicitly state the condition that relates NPI licensing to 
negative witnessing. Here is one way to do this: 
An occurrence of an NPI within a sentence is acceptable iff the matrix 
of the quantifier introduced by the NPI is an atomic formula P( . . .  ) and 
some subformula of the logical form of the sentence satisfies negative 
witnessing with respect to P. 
Obviously this will have to be revised somewhat, if only to take care of the case 
where the matrix of the NPI is not atomic, but it will serve as a starting point. (See 
(Jackson 1994) for an improved version.) 
Now contrast (59) with (62), whose logical form, given below, we should 
expect to not satisfy the negative witnessing condition: 
(64) every x(student(x), some y(apple(y), has(x, y))) 
Suppose the negative witnessing condition were satisfied for (64). Consider the 
following two models M and M' : 
studentM = {s l ,  s2} studentM' = { s l ,  s2} 
appleM = {al } appleM' = {al } 
hasM = {<s l ,  al > }  hasM' = {< s l ,  a l> ,  <s2, at > }  
Since (64) i s  false in M ,  {<s l ,  at > }  or 0 would have to be a member of the set 
of potential negative witnesses, W, for M. But M' differs from M only on has 
and { <s l ,  al > }  and 0 are both subsets of hasM' , so, by the negative witnessing 
condition, (64) must be false in M'. But (64) is, in fact, true in M ' ,  so the negative 
witnessing condition is not satisfied. 
By a similar argument, one can see that any is predicted to be licensed in 
simple negative sentences (e.g., ( 1 )), but not in simple positive sentences (e.g., (2)). 
3.2 Strong NPIs 
Before proceeding, we should recall the more restricted distribution of the strong 
NPls and our desire to relate the two types of NPI. A natural way to do this would be 
to have a parametrized negative witnessing condition; under one parameter setting, 
the condition would predict the distribution of the strong NPls, while another setting 
would yield the broader distribution of the weak NPIs. This is, in fact, possible 
within the approach I am presently describing. In particular, the parametric aspect 
will be the interpretation of Small in the negative witnessing condition. For the 
strong NPls, the interpretation of Small(w) that I propose is very simple: 
For strong NPls, Small(w) means Iwl $ 1 .  
Let us now determine some of the predictions made for strong NPIs. The 
explanations we provided for the licensing (or lack of licensing) of any in (59) and 
(62) carry over essentially without modification to their Dutch counterparts with 
ook maar, so I will not examine them again. Let us consider instead: 
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(65) Ieder kind dat ook maar iets heeft gezien mag nu naar huis gaan. 
Every child that anything has seen may now to house go 
Every child that has seen anything may now go home. 
(66) every x(child(x) 1\ some y(thing(y), has-seen(x, y)), may-now-go-home(x)) 
The question is whether (66) satisfies negative witnessing with respect to has-seen. 
It does, because the following is a suitable choice for W, as the reader can verify: 
{ {  <a, b>} I child(a) 1\ ...,may-now-go-home(a) I\thing(b) 1\ has-seen(a, b)} 
I leave it to the reader to verify that the account -predicts correctly the 
acceptability or unacceptability of the other sentences with strong NPls that we 
looked at in section 2. 1 .  Let us consider instead some of the intervention effects, 
such as the contrast between logical forms of the following two types: 
(67) no(c/J, some(x, some(?jJ, P))) 
(68) no(c/J, every(x, some(?jJ, P))) 
First, here is an example corresponding to (67): 
(69) Niemand geeft een kind ook maar iets waaraan het zich kan bezeren. 
No one gives a child anything with which he himself can hurt 
No one gives a child anything with which he can hurt himself. 
(70) no x(person(x), some y(child(y), some z(thing(z) 1\ can-hurt-with(y, y, z), 
gives(x, y, z)))) 
It is easy to see that the following is a suitable choice for W for (70): 
{ {  <a, b, c>} I person(a) 1\ child(b) 1\ thing(c) 1\ can-hurt-with(b, b, c) 1\ 
gives(a, b, c)} 
Contrast the situation with (7 1) (which corresponds to (68)) : 
(7 1 )  * Niemand geeft ieder kind ook maar iets waaraan het zich kan bezeren. 
No one gives every child anything with which he himself can hurt 
No one gives every child anything with which he can hurt himself. 
(72) no x(person(x), every y(child(y), some z(thing(z) 1\ can-hurt-with(y, y, z), 
gives(x y, z)))) 
To see that (72) does not satisfy negative witnessing, consider the following model: 
personM = {pI } 
chi ldM = {c 1 ,  c2} 
thingM = {t 1 }  
can - hurt - withM = {<c 1 ,  c 1 ,  t 1> ,  <c2, c2, t 1>}  
givesM = {<pI ,  c 1 ,  t 1> ,  <p I ,  c2, t 1>}  
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Suppose negative witnessing were satisfied. Since (72) is false in M, some subset 
S of {<pI ,  c I ,  t l> ,  <pI ,  c2, t l> }  such that lS I 5 1 would have to be in the set 
of negative witnesses W. But that would mean that the variant of M, M ' ,  where 
givesM1 = S would have to make (72) false too. But, in fact, whether givesM1 is 
{ <pI ,  c 1 ,  t I>} ,  { <pI ,  c2, t I> }  or 0 , (72) is true in M ' .  So negative witnessing is 
not satisfied. 
3.3 Weak NPIs 
Now let's return to the weak NPls, and try to see how Small( w) must be interpreted. It 
is clear that the interpretation must be relaxed, in order to allow for the acceptability 
of sentences such as the following: 
(73) At most two students have any apples. 
(74) Few students have any apples. 
However, simply increasing the numerical limit on the size of negative witness sets 
clearly will not suffice. Consider (74). As the number of students grows, so does 
the size of a negative witness set for (74). If the meaning of (the proportional sense 
of) few is less than n%, then the size of negative witness sets for (74) is n% of the 
number of students. Therefore, rather than interpreting Small as less than n, for 
some fixed n, it would seem preferable to interpret it as follows: 
For weak NPIs, Small(w) means less than 50% of the size of {x 1 4>(x)} 
for some subformula, 4>(x), of the logical form of the sentence. 
I choose 50% as the relevant figure somewhat arbitrarily. However, it seems the 
figure must be at least this high to allow for the licensing of NPIs by most (see 
below). Probably, though, it would be better to give a graded definition, by which 
I mean one that would predict diminishing degrees of NPI acceptability as the size 
of the negative witness sets gets larger. (Some confirmation for this comes from 
the fact that there is some disagreement in the literature over whether NPls can be 
licensed by most.) 
Turning our attention to the determiner at most n, we can find some indepen­
dent support for the claims that a) NPI licensing is related to smallness of negative 
witness sets (rather than, say, downward monotonicity), and b) that smallness is to 
be defined proportionally: 
(75) At most one hundred Americans have any children. 
(76) ? At most one hundred people in this room have any children. 
(76) seems to be less acceptable than (75). This contrast supports claim (a) above, 
because at most n is always monotone decreasing, no matter what emphn is. It 
supports claim (b), because n is the same numerically in each case ( 100), but not in 
a proportional sense; i .e., 100 is a relatively small percentage of the total number of 
Americans, but not of the number of people in a typical room. 
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Although I do believe that there is a contrast between (75) and (76), it also 
seems clear that (76) is not completely out, which is a prima facie problem for my 
account. I think that the reason for this is that at most n is conventionally used with 
small n, and for the purpose of expressing negative generalizations, and so even 
when n is large, at most n has the same NPI licensing properties as it has when n is 
small. In short, I relate the NPI licensing capabilities of at most n to an implicature 
associated with it (that n is small). At first glance, this seems like a somewhat ad hoc 
move to make. It is preferable to avoid appeals to pragmatics to save one's theory 
from difficulties. However, a brief digression to discuss the determiner exactly n 
will show that this appeal to pragmatics is necessary on independent grounds. 
The standard assumption in the literature is that exactly n does not license 
NPls. And, indeed, sentences like (77) seem pretty bad: 
(77) * Exactly two students have any apples. 
This fact is predicted both by Ladusaw's account (exactly n is not monotone de­
creasing) and by mine. To see that (77) does not satisfy the negative witnessing 
condition, note that the sentence is false when the ownership relation is empty. If 
the negative witnessing condition were satisfied, then the empty set would have to 
be a negative witness set. But, then, since the empty set is a subset of every set, it 
would follow that (77) must be vacuously false. This is clearly not the case, so (77) 
does not satisfy the negative witnessing condition. 
However, not every sentence with exactly n is as bad as (77). Consider the 
following example, drawn from (Linebarger 1987): 
(78) ? Exactly four people in the world have ever read that dissertation: Bill, Mary, 
Tom and Ed. 
Linebarger claims this sentence is acceptable. I have glossed it with a '? ' ,  but I agree 
that the sentence is not too bad, which is a prima facie problem for my account and 
for Ladusaw's. The point I wish to focus on, however, is that judgments markedly 
improve if exactly n is replaced with just n: 
(79) Just four people have ever read that dissertation: Bill, Mary, Tom and Ed. 
Also contrast (77) with (80) : 
(80) Just two students have any apples. 
It seems clear that just n has the same truth conditions as exactly n in these sentences 
(and not the same as, say, at most n). The relevant difference between the two 
expressions apparently must be the fact that just n implicates that n is small, whereas 
exactly n does not. Note furthermore that the n in just n need not be small in any 
absolute sense, or even relative to the size of the set quantified over, for NPIs to be 
licensed: 
(8 1 )  Just two hundred million Americans have any children. 
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Although two hundred million is both large in an absolute sense, and large relative 
to the total number of Americans, (8 1 )  is acceptable. Apparently, the implicature 
contributed by just n that n is small overrides background expectations. 
In general, the contrast between exactly n and just n seems to force us to 
the conclusion that a) NPI licensing is sensitive to implicatures, b) one relevant 
type of implicature is an implicature that some set is small, and c) in such a case, 
the relevant set need not be small relative to background expectations. What is 
significant about these conclusions is that they provide independent support for the 
account of at most n that I put forward above. There I suggested that sentences with 
at most n might license NPIs better than my theory strictly predicts because at most n 
is conventionally associated with the use of small n for the purpose of expressing 
negative generalizations. The contrast between just n and exactly n shows that we 
need to appeal to precisely this mechanism to explain the behavior of just n; hence 
it is not ad hoc to appeal to it in accounting for the facts involving at most n. 
I claim, then, that the theory I am developing can account at this point for 
sentences such as the following: 
(82) At most two students have any apples. 
(83) At most two students who have any apples are happy. 
(84) Few students have any apples. 
However, more work is needed to handle superficially similar sentences such as (85) 
and (86) : 
(85) Few students who have any apples are happy. 
(86) Most students who have any apples are happy. 
At first glance, it might seem that a set of n student-apple pairs could serve as a 
negative witness for (85) (where n is a small percentage of the number of students 
who have any apples). But, in fact, as the ownership relation varies across different 
models M(P I A), so may the number of apple-owning students. Thus, the set of n 
student-apple pairs that serves as a negative witness in one model may not be big 
enough to serve as a negative witness in another model. In general, for any model 
M, there is not going to be a single set, W, of negative witnesses that will give the 
right results. 
Recall that the idea of M(P I A) is that it denotes a model that differs 
minimally from M (viz., it differs only on P). The above remarks might be taken 
as showing that, contrary to intent, the interpretation of few varies between M and 
M(P I A). Suppose our condition were reformulated so that rather than considering 
M(P I A) for any A, we only consider variants of M that have the same number 
of apple-owning students. (The ownership relation would still be able to vary -
just not as much as before.) This would result in a fixed interpretation of few -
few would become like at most n in all essential respects. Thus, not surprisingly, 
there would now be a set of negative witnesses W for each model, and the negative 
witnessing condition would be satisfied. 
For purposes of comparison, it is worth noting that (85) and (86) are also 
problematic for Ladusaw's theory. Most and few are not downward monotonic 
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within their restrictors. 
3.4 More on Intervention Effects 
To conclude this section, let me point out an interesting contrast in the intervention 
effects associated with weak and strong NPls. For a weak NPI like any, we 
predict (correctly) that a sentence like the following is acceptable (with the exhibited 
quantifier scoping): 
(87) No teacher told more than a few students anything they �ould find useful. 
(88) no x(teacher(x), more-than-a-few y(student(y), some z(can-find-useful(y, z), 
told(x, y, z» » 
(See (39) in section 2.3.2 also.) To see this, note that a set of a few tuples of a 
teacher, a student and a useful piece of information in the tell relation will serve 
as a negative witness set. Now note that the corresponding sentence in Dutch with 
ook maar iets is not acceptable: 
(89) * Geen docent vertelde meer dan een paar studenten ook maar iets waar ze 
wat aan hadden 
No teacher told more than a few students anything that they 
could find useful 
No teacher told more than a few students anything they could find useful. 
This is what we expect since the negative witness sets are not small enough (Le., 
not � 1 )  to fulfil the condition that licenses strong NPls. 
These data are especially interesting because they support the view that 
NPls are licensed by appearing in a (possibly complex) environment with a certain 
semantic property, rather than by being in the scope of an operator with a certain 
semantic property (as in the Ladusaw analysis). There have been attempts to 
capture intervention effects within this latter approach, but these attempts have not, 
in general, distinguished among different sorts of interveners on semantic grounds, 
which seems necessary. One could, of course, offer a semantic definition of possible 
interveners, but it is surely preferable to have a single semantic condition on licensing 
environments, rather than a condition on possible licensers and a separate condition 
on possible interveners. In addition to reasons of parsimony, there is the additional 
consideration that on a "single condition" approach, it is predicted that the strong 
NPls should have a broader class of interveners than the weak NPIs. On a "two 
condition" approach, it would be possible for one type ofNPI to have both a narrower 
class of licensers and a narrower class of interveners than another type. 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Relationship of Negative Witnessing to Anti-Additivity and 
Downward Monotonicity 
A natural question to ask is what the relationship is between negative witnessing, on 
the one hand, and anti-additivity and downward monotonicity, on the other. It turns 
out that there is a simple and illuminating answer. Recall that negative witnessing 
is a condition on arbitrarily complex formulas, and not merely on operators. If we 
like, we may think of it as a condition on the environment of an atomic formula. 
Therefore, we will be interested in anti-additivity and downward monotonicity as 
conditions on environments as well . We can express these conditions as follows. 
</J is monotone decreasing with respect to P iff: 
YM, A, B(M(P I A) 1= </J A  B � A -+ M(P I B) 1= </J) 
</J is anti-additive with respect to P iff: 
"1M, A,  C(A = uC A C # 0 -+ (M(P I A) 1= </J +-+ "Ie E C(M(P I c) 1= </J)) )  
For easy reference, here is  the definition of negative witnessing again. </J 
satisfies negative witnessing with respect to P iff: 
YM3W(Yw E W(Small(w)) A YA(M(P I A) 1= -'</J +-+ 3w E W(w � A)) )  
As  discussed earlier, this i s  a parameterized condition. The results below involve 
the following two versions of this condition: 
Strict negative witnessing: Small(w) means Iw l  � 1 .  
Unrestricted negative witnessing: Small(w) places no restriction on w. 
These are, in some sense, the strongest and weakest reasonable versions of the 
negative witnessing condition. Note that strict negative witnessing is precisely the 
condition we associated with strong NPI licensing, but that unrestricted negative 
witnessing is weaker than the condition we associated with weak NPI licensing. 
The relationship to downward monotonicity and anti-additivity is the fol­
lowing: 
</J is monotone decreasing with respect to P iff </J satisfies unrestricted 
negative witnessing with respect to P. 
</J is anti-additive with respect to P iff </J satisfies strict negative witness­
ing with respect to P. 
See (Jackson 1 994) or (Jackson 1995) for the proofs. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these results is that they show that 
we can view downward monotonicity and anti-additivity as two endpoints on a 
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scale. They correspond to the strongest and the weakest reasonable versions of the 
negative witnessing condition. As we vary the interpretation of Small(w), we can 
also produce various conditions with intermediate strength. 
A convenient by-product of these results is that we can take advantage 
of results established in the literature in the Ladusaw/Zwarts tradition. For ex­
ample, it has been shown that comparatives (Hoeksema 1983) and before clauses 
(Valencia et al. 1 994) are anti-additive environments. From the equivalence of anti­
additivity and strict negative witnessing, we know that our theory also predicts the 
licensing of weak and strong NPls in these contexts. 
4.2 Explanatory Power 
At this point I would like to return to the problems relating to explanatory power 
that were raised in the beginning of this paper. The first problem was to explain 
why negative polarity items seem to take part in especially strong, or general, 
statements. Along those lines, I would claim that the negative witnessing condition 
is a natural characterization of the intuitive idea of a general statement. Essentially 
a negative witness is a set of tuples that serves as a counterexample to a statement. 
It seems natural to equate the notion of a general statement with the notion of a 
statement that is "easily counterexemplified". The second question was why there 
are the types of NPls that there are. The assumption that will allow us to answer 
this question is that negative polarity should be related to general statements, and, 
hence, negative witnessing. For this to be a reasonable assumption, it must be the 
case that general statements form a natural class, and, moreover, one which it is 
reasonable to expect to be marked via NPls. I believe this should be fairly intuitive. 
The basic idea is just that from a functional perspective, it is natural to suppose that 
general statements should be especially useful and especially common. And, in 
tum, it is not surprising that a type of statement that is especially useful or common 
should be flagged by means of certain items. Given this, we can see why the great 
majority of negative polarity items seem to be existential quantifiers. Simply put, 
most quantifiers other than the existential quantifier cannot take part in formulas 
that satisfy negative witnessing. Two exceptions are the universal quantifier and 
the negative universal quantifier. For example, the universally quantified expression 
in (90) satisfies negative witnessing with respect to the subformula ¢>(x), and the 
quantified expression in (9 1 )  satisfies negative witnessing with respect to both ¢>(x) 
and 'I/J(x): 
(90) . . .  every x( ¢>(x), 'I/J(x)) . . .  
(9 1 )  . . . no x(¢>(x), 'I/J(x)) . . .  
But suppose that the quantifiers in (90) and (91 )  were NPls, and consider what 
environments would license them. No matter what environment the quantifiers 
are embedded in, the negative witnessing condition will be trivially satisfied by the 
subformulas of (90) and (9 1 )  consisting of just the quantified expressions themselves. 
In this respect, these quantifiers are crucially different from existential quantifiers 
which require some broader context to be able to be part of a formula that satisfies 
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negative witnessing. The surprising consequence, then, is that NPI-status will not 
restrict the distribution of universal or negative universal quantifiers ! Hence, in 
theory, this means that there can be negative polarity quantifiers of these sorts, but 
that we would never know it. In practice, though, the upshot is probably that there 
are no universal or negative universal quantifiers that are NPIs - for how could 
anyone learn that such an item was an NPI? 
Another question of the same sort that we posed was why there are the 
particular types of environments that NPIs seem to prefer. Given that negative 
polarity is related to general statements, then we do not expect certain types of 
negative polarity environments. For example, we wouldn't expect a negative polarity 
existential quantifier that could occur in logical forms such as (92) : 
(92) at-least-two x(¢(x), some y(x(x, y), 1jJ(x, y» ) 
(92) is not general in any sense; no reasonable variant of the negative witnessing 
condition will hold of it. Along the same lines, we also wanted to know what the 
strong and weak NPI licensing conditions have in common. In the theory I presented, 
the licensing conditions proposed for the two types ofNPI are parameterized versions 
of a single NPI licensing condition. The resulting conditions differ only in how small 
the negative witnesses have to be. This gives, I believe, a satisfying answer to that 
question. 
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